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Harold J. Krent2 
Harold H. Bruff’s book, Untrodden Ground: How Presidents 
Interpret the Constitution, is a must read for those interested in 
understanding the myriad dynamics that shape presidents’ impact 
on constitutional interpretation. The author examines each 
administration in chronological fashion to shed light on our 
understanding of the U.S. Constitution. No other book to my 
knowledge has been so ambitious in assessing each president’s 
contributions to constitutional interpretation, and few other 
books are infused with such lively prose. 
Bruff summarizes well the influences that mold presidential 
interpretation of the Constitution: “the president’s character, 
experience, and values; the incentives that the office and current 
politics create; the practical problems that must be solved; and an 
awareness of the actions of their own predecessors” (p. 457). 
From President George Washington’s exercise of the treaty 
power to President Andrew Jackson’s supervision over the 
executive branch, and from President Abraham Lincoln’s view of 
his emergency powers to President Harry Truman’s 
understanding of the Commander-in-Chief Clause, the book 
examines circumstances that forced presidents to take action or 
make statements reflecting interpretation of the Constitution. 
These include decisions implicating constitutional interpretation, 
such as the use of military force, as well as interpretations of the 
text as justifications to refuse to enforce laws or turn over 
 
 1. Rosenbaum Professor of Law at the University of Colorado Law School. 
 2. Dean and Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Tech. 
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information to Congress. Presidents affect our understanding of 
the Constitution by both words and deeds. 
Judicial interpretation of the Constitution is studied in every 
law school and in many political science departments. Much ink 
has been spilled by legal academics and political scientists to 
generate theories on how judges should approach that critical 
task. Clashes between originalists and interpretivists take place on 
and off the bench. And, there are widely divergent views held by 
those in each interpretive camp. No consensus, for instance, has 
been reached as to the degree that originalism even is possible 
given the lapse of time or to whether interpretivism permits 
objective constraints. 
Irrespective of the ongoing originalist/interpretivist debate, 
Bruff is correct that legal and political science scholars have 
devoted relatively sparse attention to how members of the 
coordinate branches interpret the Constitution.3 As have others 
within the last generation,4 Bruff rejects the conventional notion 
that constitutional interpretation is within the exclusive province 
of the judiciary. The author makes a strong case that presidential 
interpretation of the Constitution matters more in the real world 
than judicial decisions. (He brushes aside the parallel question of 
constitutional interpretation by members of Congress.) When 
presidents sign executive agreements or break treaties, in a sense 
they interpret the Constitution, as they do when they fire 
subordinates, exercise the recess appointment power, and 
impound funds. Accordingly, his book examines the issues arising 
in each administration that impact the Constitution’s reach. 
Untrodden Ground eschews a normative account of 
presidential interpretations. For instance, does it matter if the 
presidential interpretation is reflected in deed, such as in 
President Thomas Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase (pp. 68-72), or 
rather in a statement such as Jefferson’s justification for 
 
 3. For exceptions, see generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION 
AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On 
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997); Michael C. 
Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 61; 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the 
Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994) (justifying presidential power to interpret the law but not 
examining precedential role of prior interpretations); Trevor Morrison, Constitutional 
Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189 (2006).  
 4. Contemporary constitutional theorists, by and large, agree with Bruff. For 
examples, see sources cited supra note 3. 
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pardoning those convicted of Sedition Act violations (p. 64)? 
Should less precedential weight be accorded presidential actions 
manifesting constitutional positions as opposed to more reflective 
articulation of constitutional values? Possibly, but on the other 
hand, presidents are not judges, and they are held accountable by 
the people principally for their conduct in office, not their 
constitutional analysis.5 
Moreover, should presidents defer to interpretations of 
coordinate branches and, if so, under what conditions? Should 
they defer to interpretations of prior presidents more than to 
coordinate branches? Does the extent to which the constitutional 
provision implicates presidential power as opposed to the rights 
of individuals matter? These and other questions can be studied 
by examining the steps presidents have in fact taken and what 
justifications they have used over time. 
In the pages that follow, I tackle one piece of the puzzle, 
charting the degree to which presidents should factor in the prior 
actions and statements of predecessors implicating constitutional 
views. I argue, first, that such precedents matter, and second, 
perhaps more controversially, that contemporary constitutional 
justification of actions is more salient than either unexplained 
presidential actions bearing on constitutional interpretation or 
standalone executive interpretations of the Constitution 
untethered to particular presidential conduct. The union of word 
and deed cements the precedential force of the constitutional 
interpretation. 
I. DO PRESIDENTIAL PRECEDENTS MATTER? 
As an initial matter, some may question whether presidents 
should care about any precedents—executive, judicial, or 
legislative—before taking action that manifests a particular 
interpretation of a constitutional provision. Under the 
Constitution, presidents must ensure that their actions are 
 
 5. Randolph Moss has written that “the public may elect a President based, in part, 
on his view of the law,” Randolph Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A 
Perspective from the Office of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303, 1327 (2000), but 
one would be hard-pressed to cite a campaign in which the presidential candidate’s 
constitutional interpretation had any salience, although the issue arose in the Lincoln-
Douglas debates. See also Dawn Johnsen, The Obama Administration’s Decision to Defend 
Constitutional Equality Rather Than the Defense of Marriage Act, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
599 (2012). 
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consistent with what they (and their advisors) believe to be the 
constitutional commands,6 but need not be bound by what their 
predecessors believed. Nor, in fact, need presidents be bound—
except perhaps in a particular case or controversy7—by how 
judges have interpreted the Constitution. Presidents, in other 
words, must use their best judgment in taking care to enforce the 
law and in acting as Commander-in-Chief based on their own 
understanding of the constitutional text. Indeed, President 
William H. Taft rightly insisted that a president “does not 
consider himself bound by the policies or constitutional views of 
his predecessors” (p. 206). 
Nonetheless, as Professor Bruff implicitly asserts in the book, 
the precedents of prior presidents matter. George Washington 
famously related that “[t]here is scarcely any part of my conduct 
which may not hereafter be drawn into precedent.”8 Thus, he 
knew that every step he took, from dispatching troops to quell the 
Whiskey Rebellion (p. 49) to announcing the Neutrality 
Proclamation (p. 42), likely would shape the conduct of future 
presidents by defining the scope of a president’s power under 
Article II. Many presidents thereafter self-consciously have 
defended their stances by referring to actions of predecessors. For 
instance, when President Andrew Johnson vetoed the Tenure in 
Office Act, he stated that a ban on any Senate role in removing 
executive branch officials was “settled by precedent, settled by the 
practice of the Government” (p. 169). When President Harry 
Truman resolved to intervene in Korea, he considered prior 
historical examples and, “impressed by the appearance of 
precedent” (p. 273), moved forward.9 When President Richard 
Nixon vetoed the War Powers Resolution for infringing on his 
Commander in Chief powers, he decried Congress’s effort to take 
away “authorities which the President has properly exercised 
under the Constitution for almost 200 years” (p. 338), and he later 
asserted that he was following his predecessors in impounding 
funds (p. 344). And, when President George W. Bush more 
recently defended the NSA surveillance initiative, he stated that 
 
 6. Presidents, of course, take an oath to uphold the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. 
II, § 1, cl. 8. 
 7. Even that is controversial. For an argument that presidents need not be bound in 
particular cases and controversies, see Paulsen, supra note 3. 
 8. NORMAN J. SMALL, SOME PRESIDENTIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 
PRESIDENCY 14 (1970). 
 9. Dean Acheson presented a formal defense based on those precedents (p. 275). 
KRENT_DRAFT 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/17 7:06 AM 
2017] BOOK REVIEWS 517 
 
“previous Presidents have used the same constitutional authority 
I have” (p. 412). The references to precedents might reflect more 
of an effort to persuade a skeptical public than a belief that the 
precedent matters, but even the public invocation of the historical 
examples reflects the importance of the steps taken by prior 
presidents reflecting constitutional principles.10 Presidents 
recognize the greater public acceptance from following 
precedents. 
Caring about precedents reinforces stability of the 
presidency. A president will be seen as more legitimate if he or 
she follows the constitutional path set by predecessors. For one 
example, President Washington at the outset believed that the 
Constitution permitted him to exercise the veto power solely for 
egregious congressional actions, and he vetoed only two bills.11 
That precedent stood for years as neither President Adams used 
the veto power at all.12 But, from the period of Andrew Jackson 
on, presidents exercised the veto power more aggressively, 
viewing the veto power under Article II as a permissible tool with 
which to influence domestic policy. Thus, when President Jackson 
broke ranks with his predecessors and utilized the veto twelve 
times, he was challenged for his adventurous exercise of the veto. 
(pp. 95-96). Breaking ranks, in other words, comes with a political 
price. President Jackson weathered the storm and, over time, 
presidential exercise of the veto became more routine and viewed 
as consistent with a conscientious executive. 
For another example, when President Reagan vetoed 
legislation incorporating a legislative veto, he referred to a long 
line of presidents before him who had challenged that legislative 
arrangement.13 Those precedents reinforced the legitimacy in the 
public eye of his robust view of executive powers, and his views 
ultimately found support in INS v. Chadha,14 which invalidated 
 
 10. Similarly, when President Obama issued an executive order outlawing 
discrimination based on same sex marriage, he explained why he deemed discrimination 
on that basis so inimical to the nation’s spirit and history, and he did so citing the examples 
of FDR and Eisenhower in banning racial discrimination in at least parts of the federal 
workforce. Exec. Order 13672, July 21, 2014. 
 11. At the convention, the veto power in large part was justified on the basis of the 
need to fend off legislative encroachment. See, e.g., STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS 
THAT PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON 
(Cambridge 1993). 
 12. HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 18 (2005). 
 13. Stuart Taylor, Legislative Vetoes Face Legal Attack, N.Y. TIMES, March 19, 1981. 
 14. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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the legislative veto. Bruff persuasively asserts that “[t]he ongoing 
arguments take place in a framework created by what has 
happened and what issues have been opened or closed by 
developments in our national life” (p. 458). Executive precedent 
matters.15 
II. PRECEDENT BY WORDS AND DEEDS? 
Professor Bruff does not distinguish between presidential 
interpretations reflected in words and deeds. And, of course, he is 
right that presidents affect interpretation of the Constitution 
whether dispatching troops, appending a signing statement to 
legislation, or giving a speech. The institution of the presidency 
gains stability the more that presidential interpretation is viewed 
as consistent. This is not to suggest that presidents can be boxed 
in by interpretations of their predecessors, but rather that 
perceived departures in constitutional interpretation carry with 
them a price of explanation and justification in the public eye. 
Three contexts arise. First, many presidential actions are 
unaccompanied by any statement or justification, such as dispatch 
of troops or utilization of surveillance methods. Second, 
presidents, particularly in signing statements and indirectly 
through Attorney General Opinions, address the constitutionality 
of particular courses of action. Finally, presidents at times justify 
conduct contemporaneously by reference to the Constitution. 
1. ACTION 
Although presidents in the heat of decision-making 
doubtfully consider whether to defer to executive precedents, 
some precedents are more salient than others. At one end of the 
spectrum, consider action unaccompanied by any justification. 
How are the public and future presidents to know even whether 
the presidential action embodied a constitutional interpretation? 
The president may have called for surveillance or sent troops to 
quell a disturbance without any concern as to whether the action 
was consistent with the Fourth Amendment or Commander in 
Chief Clause. Or, the president may have fired a subordinate in a 
fit of rage without paying heed to the niceties of the president’s 
 
 15. And, as Justice Frankfurter famously stated in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), judges as well 
consider history as a gloss on the constitutional text. 
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assumed removal authority under Article II. There is a latent 
ambiguity, in other words, as to whether particular deeds even 
encompass an intended constitutional interpretation. In this 
context, actions may not speak louder than words. 
Nonetheless, although others have not focused on the 
precedential value of actions unaccompanied by public 
justification,16 such actions serve to shape the course of future 
presidents’ views of the Constitution. Actions, over time, can 
embody or reflect constitutional interpretation. Consider 
presidents’ use of executive agreements throughout history. 
When presidents initially signed such agreements, perhaps it was 
out of necessity with no consideration as to the constitutionality 
of the practice. And, even if the use of executive agreements over 
time can be seen to express a view of the president’s Article II 
power over foreign affairs, the grounds are murky. Does the use 
of executive agreements comport with Article II because the 
treaty power is not exclusive or because executive agreements are 
less important than treaties? Is the use of executive agreements 
consistent with Article II as long as Congress has the opportunity 
afterwards to ratify them?  Despite the ambiguity, the repeated 
use of executive agreements over many presidential 
administrations builds legitimacy.17 The same dynamic holds true 
for presidential decisions to commit troops abroad without prior 
congressional authorization,18 and for presidential exercise of the 
removal authority.19 Presidential actions create a form of 
precedent that helps channel the conduct of future presidents. 
2. PRESIDENTIAL WORDS 
Presidential statements about the Constitution also form 
precedent. Statements by themselves can impact future 
presidencies and, at times, their influence on others can be just as 
great as action.20 Presidential statements about the 
unacceptability of discrimination based on race, for instance, have 
 
 16. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney 
General: A Normative, Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 
375, 398-99 (1993); Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (2010).  
 17. KRENT, supra note 12, at 96–102. 
 18. Id. at 112–15. 
 19. Id. at 39–46. 
 20. For a more theoretical exploration, see Hillary Putnam, The Meaning of 
“Meaning”, in MIND, LANGUAGE AND REALITY 215–71 (1975). 
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had a huge role in changing others’ view of the constitutional 
text.21 In contrast to the uncertainty that may be left by an action 
implicating constitutional interpretation, a president’s 
articulation of a constitutional interpretation less ambiguously 
articulates a view of the Constitution to be followed in the 
future.22 
Many presidential statements on the meaning of the 
Constitution can be found in writings of the President’s chief 
lawyer, the Attorney General. Congress created the Office of 
Attorney General in 1789, and directed the Attorney General to 
provide a learned opinion on questions of law when asked by the 
President.23 The very format of written opinions reinforces that 
the opinions should be available for public review and possibly 
serve as precedent for the future.  Moreover, written opinions 
generally take into account more details and circumstances than 
would oral advice. Attorney General Opinions may not reflect the 
view of presidents directly but, given that presidents select and 
remove Attorney Generals, the Opinions converge with those of 
the presidents themselves.24 
Attorney General opinions long have addressed issues of 
constitutional concern, many of which would not likely arise in a 
court challenge, such as the scope of the pardon power.25  
Attorney General Opinions not only cite but also largely follow 
prior executive precedent even when the Attorneys General 
might have reached a different constitutional interpretation had 
 
 21. FDR in Executive Order 8802 prohibited racial discrimination in the national 
defense industry, stating that “it is the policy of the United States to encourage full 
participation in the national defense program by all citizens of the United States, regardless 
of race, creed, color, or national origin, in the firm belief that the democratic way of life 
within the Nation can be defended successfully only with the help and support of all groups 
within its borders.” Exec. Order No. 8802 (June 25, 1941). 
 22. Indeed, President Madison, despite his doubts about the constitutionality of the 
Bank of the United States, signed a reauthorization bill during his term because, in his 
view, the constitutionality of the bank had been settled by practice (p. 40), and the impact 
of consistent practice has been widely noted. The precedents referred to likely included 
those of past presidents as well as the courts. 
 23. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93. 
 24. Presidents, of course, may remove Attorneys General from office for any policy 
disagreement. 
 25. Individuals likely lack standing to question presidential exercise of the pardon 
power. For an Attorney General Opinion on the pardon power, see, for example, 
Pardoning Power of the President, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 579 (April 22, 1852) (Hon. John 
Crittenden). 
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the issue not been addressed previously.26 Attorney General Wirt, 
for instance, wrote that “it would be laborious, indecent, and 
unsettling to review the previous decisions of the executive.”27 In 
opining that interest on particular claims against the government 
would not be allowed, Attorney General John Crittenden wrote 
that the previously expressed interpretation “has ever since been 
followed; and . . . such a precedent and construction must be 
considered as established and settled in this instance.”28 As Dean 
Trevor Morrison has summarized, “Attorneys General typically 
looked to the opinions of their predecessors not just as sources of 
useful experience but as authoritative precedents.”29 Executive 
interpretation may involve different analytical steps and 
considerations than that by judges,30 but the opinions, whether on 
the scope of the recess appointment authority31 or the power to 
commit troops abroad,32 create a type of precedent, even though 
in no way binding.33 Precedent shapes presidents’ interpretation 
of the constitutional text. 
Presidents have also issued countless signing statements 
manifesting their view of the constitutionality or potential 
constitutionality of the proffered legislation. The signing 
statements differ from Attorney General Opinions in several 
respects. They are less scholarly, make no pretense of creating 
precedent, reflect the President’s view as opposed to that of the 
Attorney General, and focus more narrowly on the legislation to 
which they are attached. Nonetheless, the signing statements as 
 
 26. Jerry L. Mashaw & Avi Perry, Administrative Statutory Interpretation in the 
Antebellum Republic, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 7, 44 (“Reliance on past precedent may have 
been the only interpretive rule about which every Attorney General under consideration 
appears to have been equally dogmatic.”). 
 27. HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE: CHAPTERS IN 
THE HISTORY OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 84 (1937). 
 28. Power of the Secretary of the Treasury Respecting Certain Florida Claims, 5 Op. 
Att’y Gen. 333, 353 (1851). 
 29. Morrison, supra note 16, at 1474. 
 30. See McGinnis, supra note 16, at 398–99. 
 31. Edmund Randolph, Edmund Randolph’s Opinion on Recess Appointments (July 
7, 1792), in 24 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 165, 165–67 (John Catanzariti ed., 
1990).  
 32. Authority to Use United States Military Force in Somalia, 16 Op. Off. Legal 
Counsel (1992). 
 33. For an analysis of precedent in Office of Legal Counsel decisions, see Morrison, 
supra note 16. The Office itself released guidelines suggesting that its opinions should 
receive “due respect” from successors. Id. at 1453. Attorney Generals have delegated 
opinion writing to OLC, and OLC opinions, to a large extent, reflect the views of the 
Attorney General and the President.  
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well as the Attorney General Opinions have some force as 
precedent. 
President George W. Bush controversially issued statements 
to challenge over 1000 provisions of 172 laws he signed.34 
President Obama has followed the practice, but less aggressively. 
For instance, in signing the National Defense Authorization Act 
of Fiscal Year 2013, he objected that “[c]ertain provisions in the 
Act threaten to interfere with my constitutional duty to supervise 
the executive branch,” namely by “requir[ing] a subordinate to 
submit materials directly to the Congress without change, and [the 
Act] thereby obstructs the traditional chain of command.”35 Such 
statements plainly reflect the president’s constitutional views, but 
they can best be thought of as presidential dicta or a type of 
advisory opinion. We are not sure whether the subordinate will 
submit to Congress any materials at all or whether the president 
will insist upon the right to preview and alter materials before they 
are sent.36 
President Obama’s Article II objection above echoes that of 
his predecessors. President George W. Bush as well criticized 
legislation requiring executive branch officers to issue 
recommendations directly to Congress. For instance, in signing 
the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002,37 he stated, 
“[m]oreover, to the extent such provisions of the Act would 
require submission of legislative recommendations, they would 
impermissibly impinge upon the President’s constitutional 
authority to submit only those legislative recommendations that 
 
 34. See, e.g., Karen Tumulty, Obama Circumvents Laws with “Signing Statement,” A 
Tool He Promised To Use Lightly, WASH. POST (June 2, 2014), https://www.washington
post.com/politics/obama-circumvents-laws-with-signing-statements-a-tool-he-promised-
to-use-lightly/2014/06/02/9d76d46a-ea73-11e3-9f5c-9075d5508f0a_story.html.  
 35. Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2013, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 4 (Jan. 2, 2013). 
 36. Similarly, in signing the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, H.R. 1105, 
President Obama defended his right “to indicate when a bill that is presented for 
Presidential signature includes provisions that are subject to well-founded constitutional 
objections.” In part, he stated that “[n]umerous provisions of the legislation purport to 
condition the authority of officers to spend or reallocate funds on the approval of 
congressional committees. These are impermissible forms of legislative aggrandizement in 
the execution of the laws other than by enactment of statutes.” This and other signing 
statements from 2001 to the present are available at http://www.coherentbabble.com/ (last 
visited Sept. 9, 2016). 
 37. Pub. L No. 107–295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002). 
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he judges to be necessary and expedient.”38 President Clinton also 
stated that he would interpret Section 4422 of the Balanced 
Budget Act of 199739 “in light of my constitutional duty and 
authority to recommend to the Congress such legislative measures 
as I judge necessary and expedient, and to supervise and guide my 
subordinates, including the review of their proposed 
communications to the Congress.”40 
President Obama in the 2013 Authorization Act also 
objected that “Section 1025 places limits on the military’s 
authority to transfer third country nationals currently held at the 
detention facility in Parwan, Afghanistan ... and could interfere 
with my ability as Commander in Chief to make time-sensitive 
determinations about the appropriate disposition of detainees in 
an active area of hostilities.”41 The president’s views of the 
Commander in Chief powers were just that – views. The president 
did not necessarily contemplate any change in the status of 
detainees in the Parwan facility. President Obama renewed a 
similar concern the following year in a signing statement 
responding to the Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense 
Authorization Act’s restriction on transferring third country 
nationals held at Guantanamo Bay: “the restrictions on the 
transfer of Guantanamo detainees in sections 1034 and 1035 
operate in a manner that violates constitutional separation of 
powers principles.” More specifically, Obama stated that “[t]he 
executive branch must have the flexibility to act swiftly in 
conducting negotiations with foreign countries regarding the 
circumstances of detainee transfers.”42 
Unlike the Attorney General Opinions, the signing 
statements do not of their own terms reference prior signing 
statements. No explicit form of precedent exists. Nonetheless, the 
constitutional interpretation reflected in the statements often 
follows that previously articulated and creates a form of 
precedent. Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama all signed laws 
expressing constitutional skepticism over Congress’s ability to 
direct executive branch officials to communicate with Congress 
 
 38. Statement on Signing the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, 2 PUB. 
PAPERS 2132 (Nov. 25, 2002). 
 39. Pub. L. No. 10-33, 111 Stat. 251, 414 (1997). 
 40. Statement on Signing the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1053, 
1054 (Aug. 5, 1997). 
 41. Supra note 35. 
 42. Id. 
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directly without the involvement of supervisors in the executive 
branch. Like the Attorney General Opinions, the signing 
statements resemble Advisory Opinions to a limited extent, 
expounding on how to interpret the Constitution in circumstances 
that may never arise. Although the Attorney General Opinions 
more consciously create precedent, both are sources from which 
can be discerned executive interpretation of the Constitution. 
3. BACKING UP INTERPRETATION WITH CONDUCT 
President Obama’s constitutional views as reflected in the 
2013 and 2014 signing statements took on a new dimension when 
he subsequently transferred detainees from Guantanamo to 
Qatar without first notifying Congress as required in the 2014 
Authorization Act. He ordered the transfer to complete an 
agreement for the release of Bowe Bergdahl, the sole remaining 
U.S. military prisoner of war in Afghanistan.43 In other words, he 
acted on what he had threatened in the signing statement – 
ignoring Congress’s insistence on being notified before any such 
transfer. President Obama, moreover, publicly defended his 
decision to circumvent Congress in arranging for the detainee 
swap.44 Words merged with deeds, deepening the precedential 
force of his previously stated constitutional concerns for ensuring 
executive branch flexibility in transferring foreign detainees. 
Precedents are most powerful when presidents justify 
conduct contemporaneously through constitutional 
interpretation. Indeed, Attorneys General themselves have noted 
the greater strength of executive interpretive precedents when the 
interpretations have been followed in practice.45 The justification 
serves as a limited check to ensure that the president (or staff) has 
considered the impact of the interpretation on future conduct. 
Much like Congress considering the prospective impact of 
legislation or a court considering how a rule might be applied in 
the future, such presidential reasoning assures that action has 
been preceded by at least some discussion and assessment of what 
presidents might do in the future. 
 
 43. See Tumulty, supra note 34. 
 44. Stephanie Condon, Obama: “I Make Absolutely No Apologies” for Bergdahl 
Prisoner Exchange, CBS NEWS (June 5, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-i-
make-absolutely-no-apologies-for-bergdahl-prisoner-exchange/.  
 45. See Morrison, supra note 16 (noting that “the precedential weight of those 
opinions was a function not just of the opinions themselves but also of the extent to which 
relevant executive officials acted in conformity with them”). 
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Presidential veto statements, for another example, unite 
words and deeds. When President Jackson vetoed the National 
Bank, he explained why he believed that the national government 
lacked constitutional authority under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to centralize the financial system in that manner (p. 97).46  
The union of action and deed permits the public to see at least one 
concrete consequence of the constitutional interpretation. The 
same held true for President Woodrow Wilson in vetoing the first 
Budget and Accounting Bill based on Congress’s decision to 
retain for itself a role in removing the Comptroller General and 
Assistant Comptroller General: “It has, I think, always been the 
accepted construction of the Constitution that the power to 
appoint officers of this kind carries with it, as an incident, the 
power to remove. I am convinced that Congress is without 
constitutional power to limit the appointing power and its 
incident, the power of removal derived from the Constitution. 
The section referred to not only forbids the Executive to remove 
these officers, but undertakes to empower the Congress, by a 
concurrent resolution to remove an officer.”47 And, when 
President Obama instructed the Department of Justice to 
abandon reliance on the Defense of Marriage Act in litigation 
over federal benefits to married gays and lesbians, he did so on 
the ground that the Act violated the constitutional principle of 
equality (p. 455).48 
Presidential accountability within our system of separated 
powers, after all, leans heavily upon transparency. Constitutional 
interpretation needs to be vetted publicly for a meaningful check 
to arise. The check is imperfect, but presenting constitutional 
justification to the public forces at least consideration of future 
circumstances and the judgment of history. Indeed, the heated 
controversy during the Bush II administration over release of the 
DOJ’s so-termed torture memo—defending the propriety of at 
least some forms of torture—suggests the critical step of public 
 
 46. Veto Message from Andrew Jackson to the Senate (July 10, 1832), in 2 A 
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, 576, 581-
82 (1907). 
 47. SMALL, supra note 8, at 137. Wilson’s statements would gain judicial sanction in 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (invalidating Congress’s role in removing a 
Comptroller General from office). President Jefferson’s pardon of those convicted under 
the Alien and Sedition Acts, supra text accompanying note 5, is to similar effect—the 
president, in essence, gave legal effect to his constitutional views. 
 48. See also Johnsen, supra note 5, at 599. 
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scrutiny. Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez withdrew the 
memo after the outcry (p. 421). Of course, the publicity need not 
persuade the president to desist. When an angry Senate 
demanded papers from President Cleveland as to why he fired a 
particular United States Attorney, Cleveland refused on the 
ground that it was none of the Senators’ business under the 
Constitution and directed the Senate to focus rather on whether 
to confirm the individual nominated as a replacement. 
Unpersuaded, Congress issued a resolution of censure 
condemning the administration’s refusal to supply the papers. In 
response, Cleveland wrote, “[T]he important question then, is 
whether it is within the constitutional competence of either House 
of Congress to have access to the official papers and documents 
in the various public offices of the United States.” He answered 
that Congress had no right “to sit in judgment upon the exercise 
of my exclusive discretion and executive function” in replacing 
the U.S. Attorney.49 By making his constitutional positions on the 
removal authority and presidential privilege public, President 
Cleveland contributed to the stature of the presidency.50 
Contemporaneous justification of action through constitutional 
interpretation creates the most compelling form of presidential 
precedent. 
CONCLUSION 
In short, although Bruff persuasively argues that precedent 
matters, not all precedent is of the same weight. Presidential 
actions and statements both alter the terrain, but presidential 
actions that are justified publicly have the most force. Such 
contemporaneous justification removes the ambiguity caused by 
unexplained presidential actions and increases the salience of 
presidential expression of constitutional views that are not offered 
in the context of a concrete presidential action. And, while 
presidents do not and should not afford formal deference to prior 
actions, the word and deeds of their predecessors greatly 
influence the choices they make. 
 
 
 49. See Harold J. Krent, What Would Grover Cleveland Do? Alberto Gonzales 
Should Have Learned A Thing Or Two from President Cleveland, NAT’L L. J., April 16, 
2007. 
 50. The fact that President George W. Bush did not issue any contemporary 
constitutional justification for NSA surveillance, in contrast, eroded public support. 
